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The Effect in National Legal Systems of the 
Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds 
of Age as a General Principle of Community 
Law
Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [2005] 
ECR I-9981
By Prof. Jan H. Jans*
1. Introduction
Discrimination in European law is a ‘hot issue’. The judgment of the Court 
of Justice in the Mangold case has already led to comments from a number of 
writers.1 In one of the Netherlands’ quality newspapers, the journalist, Frank 
Kuitenbrouwer, for instance, accused the Court of Justice of a lack of modesty 
and of impermissible judicial activism.2 In addition, in an editorial comment 
in the Common Market Law Review, the Court of Justice was accused of hav-
ing interpreted the EC Treaty contra legem, and it was stated that all coherence 
regarding one of the central doctrines of European law – the principle of direct 
effect – has been lost.3
In Mangold, the Court found that Community law, in particular Article 
6(1) of Directive 2000/78, precludes national legislation from permitting the 
unrestricted conclusion of fixed-term contracts of employment for workers 
aged 52 or older, and that it is for the national courts to ensure the full im-
plementation of the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age 
by refraining from applying any incompatible provision of national legislation, 
even if the implementation period for the Directive has not yet elapsed. The 
importance of this decision, however, goes far beyond the scope of the law 
of employment contracts. More generally, the possibility of invoking general 
principles of Community law in contractual relationships is at issue.
*  Professor of Public Law, University of Groningen.
1. Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981.
2. F. Kuitenbrouwer, Onbescheiden rechters, NRC Handelsblad, 7 February 2006.
3. CML Rev. 2006, p. 1–8.
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What is going on here? Is it really true that the Court of Justice has lost its 
bearings as a result of the law of employment contracts? This is reason enough 
to take a closer look at the issue of the effect of the EC prohibition on age 
discrimination in the national legal system.
2. The Principle of Non-discrimination on Grounds of Age in the EC 
 Treaty and in Directive 2000/78
The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age appears in written Eu-
ropean law in a number of places. The basic provision is Article 13(1) of the 
EC Treaty, as included by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which provides:
‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the 
limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after con-
sulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation.’4 
The exact wording of this provision was carefully chosen. The authors of 
the provision wanted to express the fact that the grounds of discrimination 
mentioned will only have effect in European and national law as a result of 
further legislative acts.5 It does not contain an explicit prohibition – which 
reveals a stark contrast with, inter alia, the prohibition of discrimination on 
the grounds of nationality in Article 12 EC.6 In other words, Article 13 does 
not contain a directly effective prohibition; it merely creates a competence for 
the European legislator to take the measures needed to combat these types of 
discrimination.
In order to comply with the task set out in the Treaty, the Council, inter 
alia, has adopted Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal 
4. Emphasis added.
5. Cf. the Grant case, Case C-249/96, [1998] ECR I-621, a case from before the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, where the Court concluded that EC law does not contain a prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. Yet it added: ‘It should be observed, however, 
that the Treaty of Amsterdam […] provides for the insertion in the EC Treaty of an Article 6a 
which, once the Treaty of Amsterdam has entered into force, will allow the Council under certain 
conditions […] to take appropriate action to eliminate various forms of discrimination, including 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.’
6. Art. 12(1) EC: ‘Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special 
provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.’
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treatment in employment and occupation.7 Article 1 of this Directive provides 
that its purpose is ‘to lay down a general framework for combating discrimina-
tion on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as 
regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the 
Member States the principle of equal treatment.’ It appears from Article 2(2) 
of the Directive that ‘direct discrimination’ occurs ‘where one person is treated 
less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1’. Notwithstanding 
Article 2(2), Article 6(1) of the Directive states that Member States may 
provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not constitute 
discrimination if, within the context of national law, they are objectively and 
reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate policy aims relat-
ing to employment policy, labour market and vocational training, and if the 
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. Under Article 16, 
the Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that all legisla-
tive and administrative provisions which are in conflict with the principle of 
equal treatment are removed. This is the legal framework within which the 
Mangold case arose. 
3. The Mangold Case
On 26 June 2003, Mr Mangold, then 56 years old, concluded an employment 
contract with Mr Helm, a practising lawyer. This contract took effect on 1 
July 2003 and lasted until 28 February 2004. The length of the agreement 
was based on para. 14(3), fourth sentence in conjunction with para. 14(3), 
first sentence of the Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsverträge 
und zur Änderung und Aufhebung arbeitsrechtlicher Bestimmungen (TzBfG). In 
short, the German law comes down to the following: in order for a fixed-term 
employment contract to be concluded, an objective reason is necessary, unless 
it concerns a worker who at the moment of concluding the employment con-
tract has reached the age of 58 years or older. In 2002, this age was reduced 
temporarily, until the end of 2006, from 58 to 52.
In proceedings against Helm before the Arbeitsgericht München, Mangold 
claimed that the German law was in conflict with European law, especially with 
clauses 2, 5 and 8 of the framework agreement on fixed-term employment con-
tracts, which was concluded on 18 March 1999, and in application of which 
7. Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ 2000 L 303/16. Based on this provision, besides 
Directive 2000/78, another Directive has also been adopted: Directive 2000/43/EC implementing 
the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ 2000 L 
180/22–26. 
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Directive 1999/70/EC8 and Article 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation were 
adopted.
The Arbeitsgericht München also doubted the compatibility of the German 
law with Community law. That court was of the opinion that there was an 
infringement of Article 6 of Directive 2000/78, since the reduction from 58 to 
52, introduced in 2002, of the age at which fixed-term employment contracts 
may be concluded without objective reasons does not guarantee the protection 
of the elderly on the employment market.
According to its Article 18(1), this Directive should have been transposed 
into national law by 2 December 2003. However, pursuant to the second para. 
of Article 18, Member States could request the Commission for an additional 
period of three years to implement the Directive. Since Germany had requested 
(and been granted) this additional period, the end of the period for Germany 
to implement the Directive is 2 December 2006.
As regards the question of whether the German law was compatible with 
the Directive, the Court of Justice held first that, according to Article 1 of 
Directive 2000/78, the purpose of the Directive is to establish a general frame-
work combating discrimination on one of the grounds mentioned in this Ar-
ticle, including age, as regards employment and occupation. The Court stated 
that, by offering employers the possibility to conclude fixed-term employment 
contracts with workers aged 52 and over, without limitation, the German 
law created unequal treatment directly based on age. However, this differ-
ence in treatment in principle can be justified, on the basis of Article 6(1) of 
the Directive, since this law has as its objective the promotion of integration 
into the workforce of unemployed older workers: ‘The legitimacy of such a 
public-interest objective cannot reasonably be thrown in doubt, as indeed the 
Commission itself has admitted’ (para. 60). Such legislation must, however, ac-
cording to Article 6(1), be ‘objective and reasonable’, whereby the Court stated 
that Member States must ‘unarguably enjoy broad discretion in their choice 
of the measures capable of attaining their objectives in the field of social and 
employment policy’ in this context. However, this review of the principle of 
proportionality turned out negatively for the German legislator. According to 
the ECJ, the application of the German legislation would lead to a situation 
in which all workers who have reached the age of 52, without distinction, 
whether or not they were unemployed before the contract was concluded and 
whatever the duration of any period of unemployment, may lawfully, until the 
age at which they may claim their entitlement to a retirement pension, be of-
fered fixed-term contracts of employment which may be renewed an indefinite 
8. Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-
term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, OJ 1999 L 175/43.
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number of times. This significant body of workers, determined solely on the 
basis of age, is thus in danger, during a substantial part of its members’ working 
life, of being excluded from the benefit of stable employment which, however, 
as the Framework Agreement makes clear, constitutes a major element in 
the protection of workers, the ECJ followed. The ECJ considered this to go 
beyond what is appropriate and necessary, as such legislation takes the age of 
the worker concerned as the only criterion for the application of a fixed-term 
contract of employment.
So far, nothing peculiar has arisen. The Court of Justice interpreted a provi-
sion of a directive and considered the German law to be in conflict with this 
provision; no more and no less. It does not seem to me that this concerns an 
improper form of judicial activism: the Court recognized the promotion of the 
integration of older workers into the workforce as a legitimate ground to justify 
the unequal treatment, and it also recognized that in their choice of measures 
necessary in attaining this, the Member States enjoy ‘a broad discretion’. The 
principle of proportionality is in this case the only thing that puts a spanner in 
the works for the German legislator. It was because of this principle that the 
German law was considered to be in conflict with the Directive.
The problem Mangold faced, however, was that for Germany the period for 
implementation of the Directive did not end until 2 December 2006. Add to 
that the fact that, according to constant case law, directives do not have hori-
zontal effect,9 and at first glance, it would appear clear that Mangold would 
have little chance of succeeding in his action against his employer Helm, even 
though the German legislation was in conflict with the Directive. The Court 
of Justice, however, held a different opinion and had essentially two arguments 
for this. 
First, the Court pointed to the so-called Inter-Environnement doctrine.10 
Based on that case law, Member States must, during the period for implemen-
tation of a directive, ‘refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to compro-
mise the result prescribed ’. The essential argument of the Court lies however 
in paras 74–77 of the judgment. The ECJ noted that Directive 2000/78 does 
not itself lay down the principle of equal treatment in the field of employment 
and occupation. Indeed, in accordance with Article 1 thereof, the sole purpose 
of the directive is ‘to lay down a general framework for combating discrimina-
tion on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’, 
the source of the actual principle underlying the prohibition of those forms 
of discrimination being found, as is clear from the third and fourth recitals in 
the preamble to the directive, in various international instruments and in the 
9. Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] ECR I-3325.
10. Case C-129/96 Inter-Environnement [1997] ECR I-7411. I will not discuss further this argument 
here. 
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constitutional traditions common to the Member States. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that ‘the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age must 
thus be regarded as a general principle of Community law.’ Consequently, once 
again in the words of the ECJ, ‘observance of the general principle of equal 
treatment, in particular in respect of age, cannot as such be conditional upon 
the expiry of the period allowed the Member States for the transposition of a 
directive intended to lay down a general framework for combating discrimina-
tion on the grounds of age, in particular so far as the organization of appropri-
ate legal remedies, the burden of proof, protection against victimization, social 
dialogue, affirmative action and other specific measures to implement such a 
directive are concerned.’ In those circumstances, it is the responsibility of the 
national court, hearing a dispute involving the principle of non-discrimination 
in respect of age, to provide, in a case within its jurisdiction, the legal protec-
tion which individuals derive from the rules of Community law and to ensure 
that those rules are fully effective, setting aside any provision of national law 
which may conflict with that law.
In sum, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age must be 
considered as ‘a general principle of Community law’; national legislation 
which is in conflict with that principle must be set aside by the national court 
(apparently also in civil relations). These considerations in particular led to the 
indignant reaction of Kuitenbrouwer and the editors of the Common Market 
Law Review. Thus, it is high time to consider their arguments. 
4. General Principles of Law and their Position in the Hierarchy of 
 Norms
Kuitenbrouwer writes the following about Mangold:
‘The most recent example is the Mangold case. This case is about an older 
worker who complained that the German law on fixed-term employment 
contracts contains prohibited discrimination. Here too a European direc-
tive was involved. The German law was in conflict with it. The period 
for implementation (transposition into national legislation) had however 
not elapsed. In fact, Germany had insisted on an additional period of 
time, since a number of adjustments to its legislation seemed necessary. 
The Court did not take this additional period into account and declared 
the German law nevertheless to be in conflict with EU law. Not on the 
grounds of the Directive, but based on non-discrimination as a general 
principle of law of the EU. Why, in that case, is a specific directive ne-
cessary?’11
11. Unofficial translation.
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This seems convincing, but it is not. The case at hand is a simple example of 
hierarchy of norms. If indeed something like a general principle of Community 
law prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age exists, this has a higher order 
in the legal hierarchy of sources of Community law than the Directive. General 
principles of Community law have (at least) the status of primary law, while a 
‘simple’ directive merely has the status of secondary law. Thus, a written pro-
hibition of discrimination may ‘merely’ be regarded as ‘a specific enunciation 
of a general principle of equality which is one of the fundamental principles 
of Community law. This principle requires that similar situation shall not be 
treated differently unless differentiation is objectively justified.’12 In other 
words, the European legislator (source of Directive 2000/78) is bound in its 
legislative task by the boundaries set by ‘higher’ law. Or, in yet other words, 
the effect of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age cannot be 
rendered inapplicable by the European legislator. That is essentially what the 
Court of Justice has stated.
Years ago, the Court answered Kuitenbrouwer’s question as to why a spe-
cific directive is necessary, although in a different context, in the Defrenne II 
case.13 That case concerned the possible direct effect of what is now Article 
141 EC.14 In that case, the Court made a distinction between ‘direct and 
overt’ discrimination on the one hand, and ‘indirect and disguised’ discrimi-
nation on the other. Direct discrimination was described as discrimination, 
which can be identified with the aid of the criteria ‘equal pay’ and ‘equal work’ 
without the need for further precision in Community or national law. These 
types of discrimination fall under the direct effect of the prohibition of Article 
141(1) EC. Indirect discrimination, on the other hand, cannot be challenged 
with the aid of Article 141 EC, since these can only be determined with the 
aid of more precise legislation. In other words, the equal pay rule contains a 
hard, legally perfect core, which can be applied as such by a court, without the 
necessity of further elaboration in directives aiming at further implementation 
and facilitation of that rule.
This obviously does not imply that directives are totally superfluous; they 
are necessary in order to eliminate precisely those discriminations, which do not 
fall under the hard and legally perfect core of Article 141 EC.15 The extensive 
12. Cf. Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel and Joined Cases 124/76 and 20/77 Moulins de 
Pont-a-Mousson [1977] ECR 1753 and 1795.
13. Case 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455. It is remarkable that the Court did not refer to Defrenne 
II at all in Mangold, but it did refer to its judgments in Caballero, Simmenthal and Solred. These 
judgments did not concern horizontal, but vertical relationships.
14. The text of which reads: ‘Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male 
and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied.’
15. See also Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 631, where the Court, in the context of the right of es-
tablishment, stated that after the transitional period, directives intended to guarantee the principle 
of equal treatment have become superfluous, because the equal treatment rule itself has acquired 
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equal treatment directives illustrate this point of view. Surely, Kuitenbrouwer 
would not want to claim that the European legislator could limit the effect in 
time of the principle of equal pay, insofar as this falls within the directly effec-
tive core of Article 141 EC?
In this context, it is also interesting to note the view of the current Dutch 
judge in the Court of Justice, Timmermans, in his contribution on Article 13 
EC in one of the leading Dutch textbooks on European law, Kapteyn- VerLoren 
van Themaat.16 After pointing out, in accordance with the prevailing theo-
ries, that Article 13 EC does not have direct effect and merely provides a legal 
basis, he stated that this cannot lead to the conclusion that discrimination 
coming under Article 13 EC is permitted as long as the Council has not taken 
any legislative measures on the basis of that provision. ‘Manifest instances of 
discrimination’ according to Timmermans will, as a rule, be susceptible to con-
demnation as being in conflict with the general principle of equal treatment! 
Senden, in her inaugural lecture, argued against this, that it is evident from 
Article 13 EC that Member States did not want to enshrine a general principle 
of discrimination on grounds of age.17 That may be so, but – in my reading 
of Timmermans – neither can it be assumed that the drafters of the Treaty 
intended Article 13 EC to limit and/or reverse the effect of the existing general 
principle of equal treatment. In other words, admittedly, Article 13 EC does 
not create new directly effective obligations for the Member States; but neither 
does it diminish the existing general principle of equal treatment.
Thus, what the Court did in Mangold in fact is not that special, at least if 
we accept that something like a general principle of Community law prohibit-
ing discrimination on grounds of age exists, and that such a prohibition may 
be relied upon before the national court. 
5. The Prohibition of Horizontal Direct Effect of EC Directives
The objections of the editors of the CML Rev. are of a different kind, and 
mainly concern the horizontal (or third party) effect of directives which this 
judgment, in their view, has created. After all, this judgment seems to make 
it possible to rely successfully on the prohibition of age discrimination in the 
direct effect. The Court continued to state that: ‘these Directives have however not lost all interest 
since they preserve an important scope in the field of measures intended to make easier the effective 
exercise of the right of freedom of establishment.’ (para. 31; emphasis added).
16. Kapteyn-VerLoren van Themaat, Het recht van de Europese Unie en van de Europese Gemeenschap-
pen, Deventer 2003 (6th edition), p. 137.
17. L.A.J. Senden, Over idealen en ideale rechtsvorming in de Europese Unie, inaugural lecture, Univer-
sity of Tilburg, 10 March 2006. The text is available on the website at: http://www.uvt.nl/webwijs/
show.html?anr=687502
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private legal relationship between employee (Mangold) and employer (Helm). 
They objected that this decision has knocked the bottom out of the prohibi-
tion of horizontal effect of EC directives. Again, my question is whether the 
judgment is really as shocking as they would have us believe?
First of all, it should be pointed out that various types of horizontal effect 
of directives exist. In our discussion, the following two types are of particular 
importance. The first type exists where an individual wishes to rely on a direc-
tive as a direct basis for his legal claims against other individuals.18
The second type is what I would like to call the CIA Security-type. In a 
relationship based on private law, one of the parties claims the inapplicability of 
public law rules that govern the legal relationship between the private parties, 
because they breach Community law. The Court recognized in the CIA Security 
case19 (and confirmed in Unilever Italia20), that in such cases the direct ef-
fect of Community law can be relied on, even in a horizontal relationship. In 
practice, this means that even in private legal relationships, rules of public law 
should not be applied when they are incompatible with a directive. No civil 
law claims then can be based on these national rules.
It follows from the paras of the Mangold case cited above, that it is in es-
sence a CIA-Security-like situation. The private law relationship Mangold/Helm 
is, to a large extent, governed by German public law rules. The German legisla-
tion in principle prohibits fixed term contracts, but the law of 2002 violates 
the prohibition of age discrimination, by lowering the age limit above which 
this prohibition does not apply to 52. By considering the law of 2002 to be 
in violation of the prohibition of age discrimination, in fact the general rule of 
the German legislation that fixed term contracts are not allowed is reinstated 
in the relationship Mangold/Helm.
The reason why the Court did not apply the CIA Security and Unilever Ita-
lia case law in Mangold has to do with the fact that the Court, it seems, further 
limited this possibility of invocabilité d’exclusion in Pfeiffer.21
The Pfeiffer case concerned an employment dispute between a number 
of ambulance emergency workers and the German Red Cross, about the 
German legislation providing for a weekly working time of more than 48 
hours and Article 6(2) of Directive 93/104 concerning certain aspects of 
the organization of working time.22 According to the Court, the directive 
provision must be interpreted as precluding legislation in a Member State 
18. This concerns ‘Faccini Dori-like’ situations: Ms. Dori who relied against the seller on the right 
laid down in a directive to request rescission of the contract of sale.
19. Case C-194/94 CIA Security [1996] ECR I-2201.
20. Case C-443/98 Unilever Italia [2000] ECR I-7535.
21. Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-8835. See also the annotation by 
S. Prechal in SEW 2005/2, p. 95–99 and CML Rev. 2005, p. 1445–1463.
22. OJ 1993 L 307/18.
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the effect of which, as regards periods of duty time (‘Arbeitsbereitschaft ’) 
completed by emergency workers in the framework of the emergency 
medical service of a body such as the Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, is to permit, 
including by means of a collective agreement or works agreement based on 
such an agreement, the 48–hour maximum period of weekly working time 
laid down by that provision to be exceeded. This provision furthermore 
has direct effect. However, the Court stated that ‘even a clear, precise and 
unconditional provision of a directive seeking to confer rights or impose 
obligations on individuals cannot of itself apply in proceedings exclusively 
between private parties.’23
Thus, the CIA Security type of horizontal effect only seems to be available 
when relying on directives that do not intend to grant rights to private indi-
viduals, as was the case in CIA Security and Unilever Italia. And since Directive 
2000/78 is unquestionably a directive that intends to grant rights to private 
individuals, Pfeiffer would mean that the German legislation that was at issue 
in Mangold could not be undermined by reference to the Directive, at least not 
in the private law relationship between Mangold and Helm.24
6. Horizontal Effect of General Principles of Law
The issue in Mangold, however, does not involve any type of horizontal effect 
of directive provisions. Neither does the Court say in Mangold that the prohibi-
tion of age discrimination, as a general principle of Community law, has ‘real’ 
horizontal effect.25 It merely says that this general principle of Community 
law can be relied on before a national court in order to challenge the validity 
of national legislation that conflicts with this norm.26 Mangold is thus ‘only’ 
about invocabilité d’exclusion, as described above. Moreover, even if the Court 
had accepted ‘real’ horizontal effect of the prohibition of age discrimination 
in Mangold, this would still be completely in line with the case law of the 
Court on the basis of which a limited number of fundamental principles of 
Community law have not only vertical, but also horizontal effect. The Court 
decided, for instance, in 1976 in Defrenne II that ‘the principle’ of equal pay 
23. Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-8835, para. 109.
24. A fortiori, and on this issue agreeing with the editorial comment in CML Rev. (see footnote 
3), Mangold would also be unable to challenge the validity of the German legislation in his 
dispute with Helm by relying on the Inter-Environnement doctrine (see para. 67 in Mangold).
25. In the sense that Helm would have a legal duty, based on this general principle of Community 
law, not to discriminate against Mangold on grounds of age.
26. That general principles of Community law can bind not only the institutions, but also the 
Member States is of course nothing new; see for instance joined cases 201 and 202/85 Klensch 
[1986] ECR 1986, 3477.
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for men and women is ‘mandatory’, so that ‘the prohibition on discrimination 
between men and women applies not only to the action of public authorities, 
but also extends to all agreements which are intended to regulate paid labour 
collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals’.27 Now, it can of 
course be objected that the Court could find a basis for this statement in the 
EC Treaty. But, if we study the relevant Treaty provision carefully, we can see 
that no ‘prohibition’ is mentioned. The Member States ‘shall ensure’ that ‘the 
principle of equal pay’ ‘is applied’. That a ‘principle’ can have horizontal direct 
effect is thus not something that the Court invented in Mangold, but can be 
traced back to case law of thirty years ago.
The well-known Bosman case also can be referred to, in which Bosman 
successfully relied on the rules regarding the free movement of persons in 
challenging the legitimacy of the UEFA’s transfer rules.28 Or take An-
gonese, who applied to take part in a competition for a position with a 
private banking undertaking in Bolzano, in the bilingual part of Italy. He 
was denied a place in the competition because he was not in possession 
of a certain certificate showing his bilingualism. Angonese challenged this 
decision of the bank before the Italian court by relying on the provisions 
regarding the free movement of workers. He claimed that the certificate of 
bilingualism required by the bank would conflict with the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality, as laid down in Article 39 EC. 
Taking into account the fundamental importance of this prohibition, the 
Court in this case reached the conclusion that it also applies to private 
individuals.29
In short, there is a steady line of case law stating that certain fundamental 
principles of European law – equal pay for men and women; prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality – can be relied on before the courts 
not only in the relationship between the individual and the public authorities, 
but also between private individuals. Accordingly, Mangold, in this sense, is 
not particularly unique.
7. The Prohibition of Age Discrimination as a General Principle of 
 Community Law
Finally we have reached the key question: what, in essence, is the legal basis 
of this prohibition of age discrimination in the employment relationship be-
tween Mangold and Helm? Can the basis perhaps be found in Article 13(1) 
27. See, in particular, para. 39.
28. Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921.
29. Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139.
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EC Treaty? As already mentioned above, Article 13 EC Treaty does not con-
tain a prohibition having direct effect, but only creates the competence for 
the European legislator to take the measures necessary to combat the types of 
discrimination mentioned. If the Court had found the legal basis for the pro-
hibition of age discrimination in Article 13 EC, then there indeed would have 
been sufficient reason to be indignant, and to accuse the Court of contra legem 
interpretation of Article 13 EC.
The Court, however, searched for, and found, the legal basis elsewhere. In 
para. 74 of the decision, we can read that the origin of this prohibition can be 
found ‘in various international instruments and in the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States’. Now, the Court did not invent this itself, or 
conjure it up out of nowhere,30 but, according to para. 74 in Mangold, based 
itself on the express wording of recitals 1 and 4 of the preamble to Directive 
2000/78:
‘(1) In accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, the 
European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which 
are common to all Member States and it respects fundamental rights, as guar-
anteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.
[…]
(4) The right of all persons to equality before the law and protection against 
discrimination constitutes a universal right recognized by the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, United Nations Covenants on 
Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, to which all Member States are signatories. Convention No. 
111 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) prohibits discrimination 
in the field of employment and occupation.’
Apparently, the Council is itself of the opinion that such a prohibition 
exists and that therefore the directive itself does not create the prohibition,31 
30. Cf. X. Groussot, Creation, General Principles of Community Law. Groningen 2006, p. 10. 
‘Principles don’t fall from heaven.’ Cf. also Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias, ‘Reflections on 
the General Principles of Community law’. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 
1999, p. 1–16, at p. 15/16. The former president of the Court of Justice believes that judicial 
interpretation with regard to general principles of Community law is a strictly legal matter and 
that this process of interpretation should not be regarded as an impermissible form of judicial 
activism.
31. The directive itself, in its operational provisions, does not contain in so many words a ‘prohibi-
tion of discrimination.
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but simply facilitates the combating of age discrimination. The Court in fact 
did no more than follow this view of the Council, mentioned in Article 1 of 
the Directive, and came to the conclusion that the Directive’s sole purpose is 
‘to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds 
of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment 
and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the 
principle of equal treatment’. 
On the other hand, the question can be posed as to whether the Court 
failed to give the matter sufficient consideration. In fact, international law is 
not as clear as all that with regard to age discrimination. The international 
instruments mentioned in the preamble indeed do contain prohibitions of 
discrimination, but are silent as regards age. Article 26 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for instance, does not mention age as a 
non-discrimination ground. The addition in the final sentence ‘or other status’, 
however, indicates that age could also be a ground of non-discrimination under 
this convention.32 The same can be said about national constitutional law. In 
many constitutions, discrimination is prohibited, the texts are however silent 
on ‘age’ as a prohibited distinguishing criterion. Thus, it is not surprising that 
the preamble of Directive 2000/78 does not mention the constitutional tradi-
tions33 of the Member States in regard to this issue.
Even if we assume that a general principle of Community law prohibiting 
age discrimination does exist, and that the core of this general principle has 
direct effect, even in private legal relationships, it does not immediately become 
clear that the German legislation in Mangold infringed this general principle. 
In my opinion, the Court should have made clear why the German legislation 
not only violated Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78, but also the general legal 
principle prohibiting age discrimination. After all, these two norms are not 
identical. Incompatibility with Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/7834 does not 
necessarily entail a manifest35 violation of the general principle of equality. 
By not doing so, the Court created the imrpression that – trapped by its own 
case law on the non-horizontal effect of directives – it wanted to get around 
this case law.
32. Also cases that have been brought in the Netherlands show that age as a non-discrimination 
ground comes under this article of the ICCPR; see for instance Central Appeals Tribunal 25 
January 2005, LJN: AS4163. See also National ombudsman, 25 July 1997, AB 1997/342 (an-
notation PJS).
33. As is well known, the ‘constitutional traditions’ of the Member States are also a source of 
Community legal principles; see the text of article 6(2) EU Treaty.
34. Or rather: with the principle of proportionality laid down in the Directive!
35. The term is used by Timmermans (see footnote 16).
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8. Conclusion
The decision of the Court of Justice in Mangold is important from the point 
of view of direct effect of general principles of law in general36 and the pos-
sibility to rely on the prohibition against age discrimination in national law on 
employment contracts in particular. Much of the criticism given with regard 
to this judgment, I do not share. That the Council, as European legislator, is 
also bound by the general principles of Community law follows from the rule 
of law, as is also shown in Article 6 EU Treaty. That directives, in some cases, 
‘merely’ intend to facilitate the enforcement of obligations, instead of creating 
new obligations, is not unique. Nor is it shocking that the Court holds the 
opinion that general principles of Community law can have direct effect and 
may also be relied on as a ‘sword’ and as a ‘shield’ in relationships of a purely 
civil law nature. The fact that there exists a general principle of equal treat-
ment in Community law is not new either. Furthermore, the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam has confirmed that ‘age’ is a suspect distinguishing 
criterion in European law. Taken all together, and against the background of 
the equal treatment obligations under general international law and national 
constitutional law, indeed this does seem sufficient, as was also the view of 
the Court of Justice, to reach the conclusion that a general principle of Com-
munity law prohibiting age discrimination exists, containing a core prohibition 
that can be relied on even in private law relationships, in order to challenge 
national legislation that conflicts with that principle. That, however, does not 
explain why the German legislation violates that principle. The fact that the 
German legislation is considered to infringe Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 
is insufficient reasoning for that conclusion.
36. Since, for the time being, I assume that the approach taken in Mangold, in principle, also can 
be applied to all other general principles of Community law.
